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ABSTRACT 
 
Kerberos it is an authentication protocol, achieves all security needed for a system like authentication, 
confidentiality, integrity Kerberos helps us to protect our data from attacker from losing information while sending 
data Through the internet. Kerberos provides a distributed authentication services that allow a client running on 
behalf of a user to prove its identity to an application server. All this process is done without sending data across the 
network that makes difficult for the attacker or the verifier to impersonate the user. This paper explains Kerberos, 
authentication model and explains how Kerberos based on secret key encryption technology uses data Encryption 
algorithm to extend security for the system. Before Kerberos, if any user wants to access the network service they 
required to enter password each time, Which is very time-consuming process and insecure methods when user 
access services on a remote machine When the user logged on to a remote machine, the password travels in plain 
text though the network. Kerberos fixes these problems when it provides single-sign-on, which lets a user log into a 
system and access multiple system or applications without the need to enter the username and password multiple 
time. In addition, Kerberos is designed so that entities have to authenticate them. 
Keywords : Authentication Protocol Cryptography, Kerberos Protocol, Authenticate Clients, Attacker, Data 
Encryption Algorithm, KDC, TGT, DCE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Kerberos was developed to enable network applications to 
securely identify their peers. To achieve this, the client 
(initiating party) conducts a three-party message exchange to 
prove its identity to the server (the contacted party). The 
client proves its identity by presenting to the server a ticket 
(shown in figures as Tc,s ) which identifies a principal and 
establishes a temporary encryption key that may be used to 
communicate with that principal, and an authenticator (shown 
in figures as Ac,s ) which proves that the client is in 
possession of the temporary encryption key that was assigned 
to the principal identified by the ticket. The authenticator 
prevents an intruder from replaying the same ticket to the 
server in a future session. Tickets are issued by a trusted third 
party Key Distribution Center (KDC). The KDC, proposed by 
Needham and Schroeder [Nee78], is trusted to hold in 
confidence secret keys known by each client and server on the 
network (the secret keys are established out-of-band or 
through an encrypted channel). The key shared with the KDC 
forms the basis upon which a client or server believes the 
authenticity of the tickets it receives. A Kerberos ticket is 
valid for a finite interval called its lifetime. When the interval 
ends, the ticket expires; any later authentication exchanges 
require a new ticket from the KDC. Each installation 
comprises an autonomously administered realm and 
establishes its own KDC. Most currently-operating sites have 
chosen realm names that parallel their names under the 
Internet domain name system (e.g. Project Athena’s realm is 
ATHENA.MIT.EDU). Clients in separate realms can 
authenticate to each other if the administrators of those realms 
have previously arranged a shared secret. 
 
The Initial Ticket Exchange 
 
Figure 1 shows the messages† required for a client to prove 
its identity to a server. The basic messages are the same for 
Versions 4 and 5 of Kerberos though the details of the 
encoding differ. A typical application uses this exchange 
when it first establishes a connection to a server. Subsequent 
connections to the same server require only the final message 
in the exchange (client caching eliminates the need for the 
first two messages until the ticket expires). In the first 
message the client contacts the KDC, identifies itself, presents 
a nonce (a timestamp or other non-repeating identifier for the 
request), and requests credentials for use with a particular 
server. Upon receipt of the message the KDC selects a 
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random encryption key Kc,s , called the session key, and 
generates the requested ticket. The ticket identifies the client, 
specifies the session key Kc,s , lists the start and expiration 
times, and is encrypted in the key Ks shared by the KDC and 
the server. Because the ticket is encrypted in a key known 
only by the KDC and the server, nobody else can read it or 
change the identity of the client specified within it. The KDC 
next assembles a response, the second message, which it 
sends to the client. The response includes the session key, the 
nonce, and the ticket. The session key and nonce are 
encrypted with the client’s secret key Kc (in Version 4 all 
fields are encrypted in Kc ). Upon receiving the response the 
client decrypts it using its secret key (usually derived from a 
password). After checking the nonce, the client caches the 
ticket and associated session key for future use. In the third 
message the client presents the ticket and a freshly-generated 
authenticator to the server. The authenticator contains a 
timestamp and is encrypted in the session key Kc,s . Upon 
receipt the server decrypts the ticket using the key it shares 
with the KDC (this key is kept in secure storage on the 
server’s host) and extracts the identity of the client and the 
session key Kc,s . To verify the identity of the client, the 
sever decrypts the authenticator (using the session key Kc,s 
from the ticket) and verifies that the timestamp is current. 
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Figure 1. 
 
Getting and using an Initial Ticket  
 
Successful verification of the authenticator proves that the 
client possesses the session key Kc,s , which it only could 
have obtained if it were able to decrypt the response from the 
KDC. Since the response from the KDC was encrypted in Kc 
, the key of the user named in the ticket, the server may 
reasonably be assured that identity of the client is in fact the 
principal named in the ticket. If the client requests mutual 
authentication from the server, the server responds with a 
fresh message encrypted using the session key. This proves to 
the client that the server possesses the session key, which it 
could only have obtained if it was able to decrypt the ticket. 
Since the ticket is encrypted in a key known only by the KDC 
and the server, the response proves the identity of the server. 
For greater detail on the messages in Version 4 of Kerberos 
the reader is referred to [Ste88] and [Mil87]. Details about 
Version 5 can be found in [Koh92]. 
 
 
The Additional Ticket Exchange 
 
To reduce the risk of exposure of the client’s secret key Kc 
and to make the use of Kerberos more transparent to the user, 
the exchange above is used primarily to obtain a ticket for a 
special ticket-granting server (TGS). The client erases its 
copy of the client’s secret key once this ticket-granting ticket 
(TGT) has been obtained, The TGS is logically distinct from 
the KDC which provides the initial ticket service, but the 
TGS runs on the same host and has access to the same 
database of clients and keys used by the KDC (see Figure 2). 
A client presents its TGT (along with other request data) to 
the TGS as it would present it to any other server (in an 
application request); the TGS verifies the ticket, 
authenticator, and accompanying request, and replies with a 
ticket for a new server. The protected part of the reply is 
encrypted with the session key from the TGT, so the client 
need not retain the original secret key Kc to decrypt and use 
this reply. The client then uses these new credentials as before 
to authenticate itself to the server, and perhaps to verify the 
identity of the server. Once the authentication is established, 
the client and server share a common session key Kc,s , 
which has never been transmitted over the network without 
being encrypted. They may use this key to protect subsequent 
messages from disclosure or modification. Kerberos provides 
message formats which an application may generate as 
needed to assure the integrity or both the integrity and privacy 
of a message. 
 
Authorization Data 
 
Kerberos is concerned primarily with authentication; it 
is not directly concerned with the related security 
functions of authorization and accounting. To support 
the implementation of these related functions by other 
services, Version 5 of Kerberos provides a mechanism 
for the tamper-proof transmission of authorization and 
accounting information as part of a ticket. This 
information takes the form of restrictions on the use of a 
ticket. The encoding of each restriction is not a concern 
of the Kerberos protocol, but is instead defined by the 
authorization or accounting mechanism in use. 
Restrictions are carried in the authorization data field of 
the ticket. When a ticket is requested, restrictions are 
sent to the KDC where they are inserted into the ticket, 
encrypted, and thus protected from tampering. In the 
protocol’s most general form, a client may request that 
the KDC include or add such data to a new ticket. The 
KDC does not remove any authorization data from a 
ticket; the TGS always copies it from the TGT into the 
new ticket, and then adds any requested additional 
authorization data. Upon decryption of a ticket, the 
authorization data is available to the application server. 
KDC 
Clien
t 
Serve
r 
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While Kerberos makes no interpretation of the data, the 
application server is expected to use the authorization 
data to appropriately restrict the client’s access to its 
resources. 
 
Among other uses, the authorization data field can be 
used in a proxy ticket to create a capability. The client 
requesting the proxy from the KDC specifies any 
authorization restrictions in the authorization data, then 
securely transmits the proxy and session key to another 
party, which uses the ticket to obtain limited service 
from an application server. Neuman [Neu91] discusses 
possible uses of the authorization data field in detail. 
The Open Software Foundation’s Distributed 
Computing Environment uses the authorization data 
field for the generation of privilege attribute certificates 
(PACs). Privilege information is maintained by a 
privilege server. When a PAC is requested by a client 
the privilege server requests a Kerberos ticket 
identifying the privilege server itself, but restricting the 
groups to which the client belongs and specifying a 
DCE specific user ID. The ticket is then returned to the 
client which uses it to assert its DCE user ID and prove 
membership in the listed groups. In essence, the 
privilege server grants the client a proxy authorizing the 
client to act as the privilege server to assert the listed 
DCE user ID and membership in the listed groups. If the 
ticket did not include restrictions, it would indicate that 
the client was the privilege server, allowing the client to 
assert any user ID and membership in any group. 
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